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INTRODUCTION
 In The Second-Person Standpoint (SPS) and a number of papers 
since, I have attempted to work out a theory of moral obligations as 
involving mutual accountability between equals, where the latter, I 
argue, is irreducibly second personal, since it entails an equal author-
ity we have to address claims and demands to one another and our-
selves.1 As many writers have pointed out, moral obligations concern 
the part of morality that is modeled conceptually on legal, or as 
Sidgwick called them, “quasi-jural,” concepts of responsibility and 
authoritative demands and claims.2 What we are morally obligated to 
do is not just what morality recommends or what there is good, 
weighty, or perhaps even conclusive reason to do from the moral 
point of view. It is what morality requires. It is what is legitimately 
demanded of us as moral agents or persons, just as legal obligations 
concern what the law demands of citizens subject to it. Illegal and 
????????????????????????????????????????????????????????
? Andrew Downey Orrick Professor of Philosophy, Yale University; John Dewey 
Distinguished University Professor Emeritus, University of Michigan. Stephen Darwall 
has written widely on the history and foundations of ethics. His most important books 
include IMPARTIAL REASON (1983), THE BRITISH MORALISTS AND THE INTERNAL ‘OUGHT’:
1640-1740 (1995), PHILOSOPHICAL ETHICS (1998), WELFARE AND RATIONAL CARE (2002), and 
THE SECOND-PERSON STANDPOINT (2006).?
??  J.D. Candidate, 2012, New York University School of Law; B.A., Philosophy, 2006, 
Yale College. We are indebted to the participants in The Florida State University College 
of Law Symposium on Civil Recourse Theory for comments and helpful discussion.?
 1.  STEPHEN DARWALL, THE SECOND-PERSON STANDPOINT: MORALITY, RESPECT,
AND ACCOUNTABILITY (2006) [hereinafter DARWALL, SECOND-PERSON STANDPOINT]; 
Stephen Darwall, But It Would Be Wrong, 27 SOC. PHIL. & POL. 135 (2010); Stephen 
Darwall, Moral Obligation: Form and Substance, 110 PROC. ARISTOTELIAN SOC. 31
(2010). This Article is a collaborative attempt by the authors to say something about how 
the second-personal framework developed in SPS and more recent papers, for example, 
Stephen Darwall, Bipolar Obligation, in 7 OXFORD STUDIES IN METAETHICS (Russ Shafer-
Landau ed., forthcoming 2012) [hereinafter Darwall, Bipolar Obligation] might apply to 
tort law and, more specifically, to civil recourse theory. In what follows, the authorial “I,” 
“my,” etc., will refer to Stephen Darwall, and the authorial “we,” etc., will refer to both 
coauthors of this Article, Julian Darwall and Stephen Darwall. “You” will refer to you, dear 
reader, and “we,” used nonauthorially, will have its usual presumptive sense—referring to 
you, the authors, and indeterminate others. We regret any confusion; perhaps, however, 
presuming on your pronominal sensitivity is appropriate in a paper about “second-
personal” matters.?
 2.  HENRY SIDGWICK, THE METHODS OF ETHICS 106 (7th ed. 1967); G.E.M.
ANSCOMBE, Modern Moral Philosophy, in VIRTUE ETHICS 26 (Roger Crisp & Michael Slote 
eds., 1997).?
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wrongful actions are violations of what the law and the moral law, 
respectively, mandate or require. 
 Similarly, both moral and legal obligations conceptually entail dis-
tinctive forms of responsibility or accountability. What we are moral-
ly obligated to do is what we are responsible or accountable for doing, 
just as legal obligations entail legal responsibilities. I argue that 
moral responsibility is irreducibly second personal since it entails 
accountability or answerability, and that these are always, as a con-
ceptual matter, to someone with the authority to hold us thus an-
swerable (even if that person is we ourselves). When it comes to mo-
rality, theological voluntarists, like the early modern natural law 
theorists Pufendorf and Locke, hold that the moral law implicates 
our accountability to God.3 My theory is that moral obligations con-
cern our accountability to one another and ourselves as equal moral 
persons or members of the moral community. 
 The idea of answerability is no less implicated in our idea of law, 
pure and simple. Criminal proceedings seem, by their very nature, to 
involve answering charges, defenses, determinations of culpability, 
mitigation, excuses, and holding the guilty accountable through crim-
inal punishment. Similarly, proceedings in civil or private law, in-
cluding torts, involve a form of answerability, although one that is 
importantly different from that involved in criminal cases. Com-
plaints are brought not by the state on behalf of the community as a 
whole but by individual plaintiffs, who claim to have been injured by 
the violation of a legal obligation or duty to them. In civil proceed-
ings, defendants are required to respond to such complaints, and 
courts attempt to establish the justice of the complaint and, if justi-
fied, whether compensation of some sort is owed by the defendant to 
the victim. 
 In some recent papers, I suggest that the form of authority and 
accountability that underpins civil or private law is different from 
that at the root of criminal law and that this legal distinction tracks 
a moral distinction between, respectively, obligations that are owed 
to others, so called “relational,” “directed,” or “bipolar” obligations, 
and moral obligation, pure and simple, or as I sometimes call it, mor-
al obligation period.4 As a moral philosopher, I have mainly been in-
terested to point to differences between civil and criminal law that I 
take to be uncontroversial among legal philosophers—that civil cases 
????????????????????????????????????????????????????????
 3.  JOHN LOCKE, ESSAYS ON THE LAW OF NATURE (W. von Leyden ed., 2002) (1676); 
SAMUEL VON PUFENDORF, OF THE LAW OF NATURE AND NATIONS (C.H. Oldfather & W.A. 
Oldfather trans. 1934) (1688).?
 4.  Darwall, Bipolar Obligation, supra note 1; Stephen Darwall, Law and the Second-
Person Standpoint, 40 LOY. L. REV. 891, 905-09 (2007); see also Michael Thompson, What 
is it to Wrong Someone? A Puzzle About Justice, in REASON AND VALUE: THEMES FROM 
THE PHILOSOPHY OF JOSEPH RAZ 333, 338-45 (R. Jay Wallace et al. eds., 2004). ?
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are appropriately brought by plaintiffs and that criminal cases are 
brought by “the people” and their representatives—in order to illus-
trate by analogy differences that I have been arguing exist in morali-
ty between relational or bipolar moral obligations and moral obliga-
tions period. 
 Here, however, we want to say something about how the second-
personal framework I have been developing might apply to tort law, 
particularly to an important and influential theory of torts: the civil 
recourse theory that has been worked out in the writings of John 
Goldberg and Benjamin Zipursky. In our view, civil recourse theory 
captures an important truth about the structure of relational or bipo-
lar legal obligations, which we take to be the kind that are normally 
involved in torts, namely, that injured victims of violated bipolar ob-
ligations owed to them have a distinctive standing to hold their injur-
ers responsible that neither third parties nor the community at large 
have. I have called the analogous moral standing individual authority.
This is an authority that, distinctively, obligees (that is, individuals to 
whom bipolar moral obligations are owed, or correlatively, claim-
right holders) have to hold obligors accountable to them individually.
This authority is individual, moreover, in the further sense that it is 
discretionary; it is distinctively up to the individual who has the au-
thority whether or not to exercise it. For example, a victimized obli-
gee has a distinctive individual authority to decide whether to com-
plain or to seek an apology or to forgive a deadbeat obligor, or, indeed, 
to pursue any combination of these options; she can exercise this au-
thority at her discretion. We believe that the distinctive moral stand-
ing that is involved in being owed a bipolar moral obligation and hav-
ing a correlative claim right against an obligor are de jure analogues 
of (de facto) bipolar legal obligations and claim rights that are in play 
in tort law and that the former plausibly underpin the latter. 
 By contrast, the authority that is implicated in moral obligation 
period (and, by analogy, in the criminal law) is no individual’s au-
thority but something we have as representative persons or members 
of the moral (or legal) community. I argue in SPS that we presuppose 
such an authority when we hold one another and ourselves accounta-
ble for unexcused moral wrongs, for example, through what P.F. 
Strawson called “reactive attitudes,” such as indignation, moral 
blame, and self-blaming attitudes like guilt.5 We do not presuppose 
any such authority as the particular individuals we are or as having 
any particular relation to the wrongdoer. We presuppose it rather as 
representative persons or members of the moral community. Nor is 
this authority discretionary. When we feel blame toward and thereby 
????????????????????????????????????????????????????????
 5.  P.F. Strawson, Freedom and Resentment, in STUDIES IN THE PHILOSOPHY OF 
THOUGHT AND ACTION 71, 76 (P.F. Strawson ed., 1968).?
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imaginatively address a putatively valid demand to someone, we, as 
it were, “second” or “give voice” to a demand that we take to be legit-
imate from the third-party (not to say, “third-person”—more on this 
later) perspective of a representative person. 
 We shall therefore argue that what civil recourse theory gets right 
is the distinctive individual authority that victims have to hold their 
victimizing obligors accountable to them. However, defenders of the 
civil recourse theory sometimes present their view as legitimating 
retaliation, vengeance, or action against victimizers by victims. Here 
we shall suggest that an understanding of true mutual accountability 
between obligees and obligors—correlatively, between claim-right 
holders and those they hold rights against—shows this to be mistak-
en. To realize genuine mutual accountability between equals, tort 
actions should be seen as expressing a kind of mutual respect that is 
actually incompatible with retaliation and vengeance. The latter no-
tions, I have argued, invoke a notion of respect that is more at home 
in honor cultures—where dishonoring, status-lowering disrespect can 
be annulled by reciprocating disrespect (e.g., revenge).6 In “accounta-
bility cultures,” as I have called them, disrespect calls for attitudes 
and treatment that respectfully demand respect. 
 As we see it, the idea of justified retaliation is not really central to 
civil recourse theory, and, to be fair, Goldberg and Zipursky’s allusions 
to it seem offhand and noncommittal. The present Article might 
therefore best be seen as an argument for developing civil recourse in 
one way rather than another: that is, within a framework of mutual 
accountability rather than legitimate reprisal. In addition, we suggest a 
tentative account of tort remedy and process within that framework. 
I. BIPOLAR OBLIGATIONS AND MORAL OBLIGATION PERIOD
 We shall begin by saying something about how the ideas of moral 
obligation period and bipolar or relational moral obligations or duties 
differ conceptually. Here we assume that the kind of relational duties 
we are concerned with are not merely conventional or even legal but 
moral in the sense that violation of a bipolar obligation to someone 
wrongs that person, other things being equal at least. 
 On a second-personal analysis, both moral obligations period and 
bipolar obligations involve legitimate demands and so presuppose an 
authority to make the demand and hold the person who is subject to 
the obligation accountable. What distinguishes the two is the differ-
ent authorities they respectively presuppose. 
????????????????????????????????????????????????????????
 6.  Stephen Darwall, Two Kinds of Recognition Respect for Persons, 88 ETHICS 36, 37
(1977); Stephen Darwall, Two Kinds of Recognition Respect for Persons, in EGUALE
RISPETTO (Ian Carter ed., 2008); Stephen Darwall, Justice and Retaliation, 39 PHIL.
PAPERS 315, 321 (2010).?
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 To see moral obligation period’s conceptual tie to legitimate de-
mand, consider the idea of morally supererogatory action. The con-
cept of a supererogatory act is that of an act that morality recom-
mends but does not require, that is, an act that, “is above and beyond 
the call of duty.” Such an act might be thought to be morally good for 
the agent to do, but one that the agent is nonetheless not morally ob-
ligated or required to do, say, because it involves a level of sacrifice 
that cannot be legitimately demanded of him or her. Now notice that 
whether there are any supererogatory actions, whether this concept 
is actually instantiated, is a substantive normative issue and there-
fore a conceptually open question. Some normative ethical theories—
for example, act consequentialism—hold that there can be no such 
thing. On an act consequentialist theory of right, moral agents are 
always under a moral obligation to do whatever morality would most 
recommend they do—by consequentialism’s lights, to perform the ac-
tion, of those available to them, that would produce the best conse-
quences overall. But act consequentialism is a substantive normative 
theory, not a conceptual one. No normative theory, neither act conse-
quentialism nor any other, could hold that supererogation is concep-
tually impossible. 
 If a critic claims act consequentialism to be “too demanding” and a 
consequentialist denies this, they must employ the same concept of 
moral obligation to disagree. The consequentialist must agree that 
the possibility of supererogation is conceptually open, even if she de-
nies as a normative thesis that there is any such thing. She must 
agree that her critic is not being self-contradictory or conceptually 
confused when she denies consequentialism because it denies the 
(normative) possibility of supererogatory action.  
 The space between the concepts of moral recommendation, howev-
er weighty, and moral obligation is explained by the latter’s (but not 
the former’s) conceptual tie to legitimate demand and accountability. 
Any discussion of whether consequentialism is “too demanding” a 
moral theory assumes, as we all normally do, that what is morally 
obligatory is what morality demands, that is, what we are legitimate-
ly held accountable for as moral agents. 
 The Second-Person Standpoint follows a number of philosophers, 
including John Stuart Mill, Richard Brandt, and Allan Gibbard, in 
arguing that the concepts of moral obligation, duty, right, and wrong 
are tied to those of legitimate demand, accountability, and, therefore, 
conceptually to moral blame.7 What is morally obligatory is not just 
what there are good moral reasons to do, however weighty these rea-
????????????????????????????????????????????????????????
 7.  RICHARD B. BRANDT, A THEORY OF THE GOOD AND THE RIGHT 163-76 (1979); 
DARWALL, SECOND-PERSON STANDPOINT, supra note 1; ALLAN GIBBARD, WISE CHOICES,
APT FEELINGS: A THEORY OF NORMATIVE JUDGMENT 132 (1990); JOHN STUART MILL,
UTILITARIANISM Ch. 5 (Roger Crisp ed., 1998) (1863). ?
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sons might be. It is what it would be morally wrong not to do. And a 
moral wrong is not just any kind of moral failing, but what it would 
be blameworthy to do, were one to do it without excuse.8 As Mill put 
it, “There are other things . . . which we wish that people should do, 
which we like or admire them for doing, perhaps dislike or despise 
them for not doing, but yet admit that they are not bound to do . . . .”9
In these cases, Mill adds that “it is not a case of moral obligation; we 
do not blame them.”10 It is a conceptual truth that an act is morally 
wrong if, and only if, it is blameworthy if done without excuse. 
 Blame, as it functions in this line of thought, is not a speech act 
but a Strawsonian reactive attitude. When we blame someone in 
speech, indeed, we normally intend to express, and to be taken by our 
interlocutor to express, the distinctive attitude of blame. SPS follows 
Strawson in arguing that reactive attitudes have a special role in 
mediating human practices of responsibility—more precisely, ac-
countability or answerability—because they are essentially “inter-
personal,” as Strawson put it, or “second personal,” in the terms of 
SPS.11 They implicitly address demands to their objects in a way that 
other critical attitudes like disdain or contempt need not. And they 
presuppose an authority to address the demand and bid for the oth-
er’s recognition of that authority. They have an implicit R.S.V.P.
 Strawson did not give a formal definition of reactive attitudes, but 
their central features are clear from the role they play in his argu-
ment about moral responsibility and freedom of the will. Strawson’s 
core idea is that reactive attitudes involve a characteristic, “interper-
sonal” way of regarding the individuals who are their objects that 
commits the holder of the attitude to certain assumptions about the 
object individual and her capacities to regulate her will. Unlike “ob-
jective attitudes,” such as disdain, disgust, and annoyance, reactive 
attitudes are essentially characterized by “involvement or participa-
tion with others in inter-personal human relationships.”12 There is 
always a second-personal element to reactive attitudes. Through the 
????????????????????????????????????????????????????????
 8.  Note that the concepts of moral wrong and of violation of moral obligation are 
nonetheless distinct from that of blameworthiness. Something is morally wrong and 
violates a moral obligation if, and only if, it would be blameworthy if done without excuse.
Excuses defeat claims of blameworthiness but not that of having done moral wrong. To the 
contrary, an excuse itself presupposes that the conduct it excuses was nonetheless wrong.?
 9.  MILL, supra note 7, at para. 14.?
 10.  Id. (“We do not call anything wrong, unless we mean to imply that a person ought 
to be punished in some way or other for doing it; if not by law, by the opinion of his fellow 
creatures; if not by opinion, by the reproaches of his own conscience.”).?
 11.  DARWALL, SECOND-PERSON STANDPOINT, supra note 1, at 8-9; STRAWSON, supra
note 5; see also Gary Watson, Responsibility and the Limits of Evil, in RESPONSIBILITY,
CHARACTER, AND THE EMOTIONS: NEW ESSAYS IN MORAL PSYCHOLOGY 263 (F.D. 
Schoeman ed., 1987) [hereinafter Watson, Responsibility and the Limits of Evil]; Gary 
Watson, Two Faces of Responsibility, 24 PHIL. TOPICS 227-48 (1996).?
 12.  STRAWSON, supra note 5, at 79.?
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attitude, we hold its object to something and thereby implicitly make 
a demand of (and so implicitly address the demand to) him or her. As 
Strawson put it, “The making of the demand is the proneness to such 
attitudes.”13 The reason that reactive attitudes distinctively implicate 
freedom of the will, then, is that we can intelligibly address a demand 
to someone to regulate her will appropriately only if we suppose that 
she can so regulate it as a result of recognizing our demand’s legiti-
macy. That supposition is, as Gary Watson says, a “constraint[] on 
moral address.”14 In this way, reactive attitudes like moral blame are 
unlike other critical attitudes, such as disesteem, contempt, and dis-
gust, which lack an intrinsically addressing, second-personal ele-
ment, whether these latter take a distinctively moral form, as in 
moral disesteem or disgust, or not. 
 Strawson makes a distinction, which is important to our argu-
ment, between personal and impersonal reactive attitudes. A person-
al attitude, like resentment, is felt as if from the perspective of an 
involved party (like the victim in a tort), while an impersonal reac-
tive attitude is felt as if from an uninvolved, third party’s standpoint. 
It is, however, crucial to Strawson’s argument, as it is to that of SPS
and to our argument here, that both personal and impersonal reac-
tive attitudes are essentially “interpersonal” in Strawson’s sense (or 
“second personal” in ours), since both implicitly address demands. 
Thus “first-party” reactive attitudes, like guilt, second-party atti-
tudes, like resentment, and third-party attitudes, like indignation or 
moral blame, are all equally “interpersonal” or second personal.15 “Se-
cond person” does not mean “second party.” Reactive attitudes, 
whether personal or impersonal, are all equally second personal in 
having implicit addressees. As Strawson puts it, they are all equally 
“participant” as opposed to “objective” attitudes, such as annoyance, 
disesteem, or disgust. 
 If moral obligations period are what it would be blameworthy to 
fail to do without excuse, and if blame is an impersonal reactive atti-
tude that implicitly makes a demand, then both obligation and blame 
presuppose the idea of a standing or authority that any third party, 
or as we might put it, any representative person or member of the 
moral community, has to hold wrongdoers responsible and implicitly 
address the demand to them. We can formulate this point by saying 
that each and every one of us has a representative authority to ad-
????????????????????????????????????????????????????????
 13.  Id. at 92 (emphasis omitted).?
 14.  Watson, Responsibility and the Limits of Evil, supra note 11.?
 15.  The first two are personal reactive attitudes; the third is an impersonal 
reactive attitude.?
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dress the moral demands we implicitly make of ourselves and one 
another, as we presuppose when we feel blame.16
 I argue that bipolar moral obligations, that is, directed duties 
whose violation entails that the violating obligor has injured and, at 
least other things equal, wronged his obligee, also conceptually entail 
an authority to address claims and demands.17 However, the kind of 
authority distinctive of bipolar obligations is not representative au-
thority but an individual authority that the individual obligee has to 
make claims and demands of an obligor who is obligated to him and 
to hold the obligor personally accountable. To be sure, violations of 
bipolar obligations not only wrong the obligee; they are also wrong 
period, at least other things being equal.18 And this entails, on a se-
cond-personal analysis, that third parties have a representative au-
thority to hold the wrongdoer accountable as well. But third parties 
do not have the distinctive individual authority that the victim has 
and which, moreover, he may exercise at his discretion. 
 As Hohfeld famously pointed out, bipolar obligations entail correl-
ative claim rights and vice versa.19 If X is obligated to Y to do A, then 
Y has a right against X that X do A. SPS follows Joel Feinberg in 
maintaining that claim rights conceptually implicate a distinctive 
standing (individual authority) to claim that to which they are enti-
tled.20 It follows that bipolar obligations essentially involve this dis-
tinctive second-personal authority also.21
 We can easily imagine a society (Feinberg’s “Nowheresville”) in 
which it is thought morally wrong (period) to step on others’ feet, un-
less, say, they desire or do not mind one’s doing so; but where the lat-
ter is not seen as a giving of consent, which can only be understood 
only within a framework of bipolar obligations and claim rights. Con-
sent, by definition, is required for actions that would otherwise wrong 
the person who gives it. In Nowheresville, others’ will and preference 
appear simply as features of the moral landscape that bear on moral 
????????????????????????????????????????????????????????
 16.  See Darwall, Bipolar Obligation, supra note 1 (Note that no authority to express 
this attitude publicly follows straightway.  What standing anyone has to do that I take to 
be a substantive normative, rather than a conceptual, matter.).?
 17.  Id. ?
 18.  This is true unless the obligor has a justification for the violation. In this case, the 
action is no longer wrong, even if there remains a compensable injury. We take it to be a 
semantic choice whether or not to say that the obligee is “wronged” in this case. We can 
follow Jules Coleman and say that in such cases the entailed claim right (and bipolar 
obligation) are “infringed” rather than “violated.” JULES L. COLEMAN, RISKS AND 
WRONGS 300 (1992).?
 19.  WESLEY NEWCOMB HOHFELD, FUNDAMENTAL LEGAL CONCEPTIONS AS APPLIED 
IN JUDICIAL REASONING 65-75 (Walter Wheeler Cook ed., Greenwood Press 1978) (1919).?
 20.  JOEL FEINBERG, The Nature and Value of Rights, in RIGHTS, JUSTICE, AND THE 
BOUNDS OF LIBERTY 143, 151 (1980) (stating that “having a claim consists [of] being in a 
position to claim, that is, to make claim to or claim that”) (emphasis omitted).?
 21.  The next several paragraphs draw heavily from Darwall, Bipolar Obligation,
supra note 1.?
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obligations period. Others are not regarded as having any prerogative, 
normative power, or authority to consent, where consent is conceived 
as something that can be given only through a second-personal address 
that reciprocally presupposes the individual authority to release one 
from what would otherwise be a bipolar obligation to the other. 
 Consent in this sense can only be given second personally, and it 
implicates bipolar obligations and claim rights by definition.22 It is an 
exercise of a normative power, in this case, to release someone from a 
bipolar obligation he would otherwise have had, say, not to step on 
your feet.23 Normative powers, in general, are authorities or stand-
ings to enter into reciprocally recognizing, second-personal engage-
ments with others that alter bipolar obligations and claim rights be-
tween the parties, but which also presuppose that the parties are al-
ready obligated to one another in various ways. Other essentially bi-
polar normative powers include the authority to make promises, to 
enter into agreements and contracts, and to exercise such prosaic 
normative capacities as simply asking someone to do something or 
acceding to a request.24
 The power of consent is but one of an ensemble of individual nor-
mative powers or authorities that enter into the having of a claim 
right against someone and therefore into another’s having a bipolar 
obligation to one. Moreover, these powers or authorities are all essen-
tially second personal. Feinberg emphasizes that the right holder’s 
authority to demand or claim her rights enters into the very idea 
that she has a claim right. “[I]t is claiming,” Feinberg writes, “that 
gives rights their special moral significance.”25 The authority to claim 
our rights “enables us to ‘stand up like men,’ to look others in the eye, 
and to feel in some fundamental way the equal of anyone.”26 When we 
regard persons as having a claim right that others not step unbidden 
on their feet, part of what we think is that each person has a distinc-
tive set of individual authorities over others’ conduct with respect to 
his feet that he does not have with respect to the treatment of other 
people’s feet. And these powers include the individual authority to 
hold the person against whom the right is held personally accounta-
ble. If the right is violated, the right holder has an authority or 
????????????????????????????????????????????????????????
 22.  ARTHUR RIPSTEIN, FORCE AND FREEDOM 111-32 (2009); Darwall, Bipolar 
Obligation, supra note 1.?
 23.  JOSEPH RAZ, PRACTICAL REASON AND NORMS 98-104 (1999); Joseph Raz, 
Voluntary Obligations and Normative Powers, 46 ARISTOTELIAN SOC’Y 79, 92-101 (Supp. 
Vol. 1972).?
 24.  David Enoch, Giving Practical Reasons, 11 PHILOSOPHERS’ IMPRINT 4 (2011), 
Gary Watson, Promises, Reasons, and Normative Powers, in REASONS FOR ACTION 155-78 
(David Sobel & Steven Wall eds., 2009); Stephen Darwall, Demystifying Promises, in
PROMISES AND AGREEMENTS 255, 268-76 (Hanoch Scheinman ed., 2011). ?
 25.  FEINBERG, supra note 20, at 151.?
 26.  Id.?
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standing that others do not have to decide whether or not to com-
plain, seek apology or compensation, or to forgive. 
 Right holders have a distinctive authority to hold others answera-
ble for violations of their rights that third parties do not have. The 
point is not that third parties have no authority. To the contrary, I 
argue in Bipolar Obligation that the individual authorities that 
right-holding obligees have can exist only if obligees share a repre-
sentative authority with third parties, as well as with any obligor who 
might violate their rights.27 The point is that there is a special indi-
vidual authority an obligee has to hold the obligor personally an-
swerable that can, like the power of consent, be exercised only by the 
right-holding obligee herself at her discretion. 
 One way to see this is to reflect on forgiveness.28 Just as it is 
uniquely up to the right holder to decide whether or not to consent or 
to waive her right (assuming the right is waivable), so is it distinc-
tively up to a victim whose right has been violated whether to forgive 
someone who has violated it. No one else has the same authority or 
standing.29 Moreover, just as the power to consent can exist only 
against the background of bipolar obligations and rights that are in 
force without consent, so also can the authority to forgive exist only 
against the background of a distinctive authority that obligees and 
right holders have to hold their obligors personally responsible. For-
giveness involves the victim’s somehow moving past personal reactive 
attitudes, like resentment, that mediate personal responsibility.30
 The situation is similar with apology. An apology is, by definition, 
addressed to someone who receives it and who has the authority to 
accept it or not. If a victim comes upon an unaddressed admission of 
guilt and expression of sincere regret in her victimizer’s diary, she 
has not discovered an apology.31 Apologies are a way of holding one-
self personally answerable to an obligee whose authority to hold one 
thus answerable is thereby reciprocally recognized. It is a second-
personal acknowledgment of having violated a bipolar obligation to 
the obligee and of the obligee’s special authority to hold one answera-
ble for it. 
 On a Strawsonian analysis, impersonal or “third-party” reactive 
attitudes through which we hold ourselves and others accountable, 
and presuppose the representative authority to do so, are implicated 
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in the concept of moral obligation period. A moral obligation (period) 
is what it would be blameworthy not to do, were one to fail to perform 
without excuse. Similarly, personal reactive attitudes are implicated 
in the concept of a directed duty or bipolar obligation. A bipolar obli-
gation exists where failure to perform would warrant the obligee in 
resenting the obligor. 
 To summarize, moral obligations period and bipolar moral obliga-
tions involve different authorities to address their demands and hold 
obligated subjects answerable for compliance. Bipolar obligations of 
the sort underpinning the legal obligations in play in tort law in-
volve, as part of their conceptual structure, an individual authority 
that obligees have to hold obligors personally accountable to them. 
II. CIVIL RECOURSE, CORRECTIVE JUSTICE, AND                                       
INDIVIDUAL AUTHORITY
 We turn now to tort law and to civil recourse theory as a theory of 
torts. To this point, we have been considering conceptual claims 
about moral obligation period and bipolar moral obligations, includ-
ing arguments that these concepts respectively involve distinctive 
forms of authority—representative and individual authority, respec-
tively—and distinctive forms of accountability. Torts involve viola-
tions of bipolar legal obligations, not moral ones. But though the le-
gal obligations that torts violate are not themselves moral or even 
necessarily de jure in some broader nonmoral sense, they arguably 
nonetheless purport to have de jure force, as even legal positivists 
can allow. If this is so, and if, as we submit, the arguments of SPS
apply to de jure obligation and authority more generally and not just 
to morality more narrowly conceived, it will follow that torts must 
purport to involve a distinctive form of accountability that is analo-
gous to that involved in bipolar moral obligations and claim rights; 
namely, a distinctive accountability of tortfeasors to their victims. We 
believe that civil recourse theory can give theoretical expression to 
this fact, though we shall suggest that it can do so adequately only if 
it is developed in a way that stresses the mutual accountability of 
tortfeasor and victim alike. 
 Civil recourse theory seeks to reframe the theory of torts in a 
fundamental way. As Goldberg and Zipursky see it, torts came in the 
last century to be viewed primarily in terms of the fair or efficient 
allocation of costs, an idea whose root they find in Holmes and in 
later writers like Prosser and law and economics theorists like Cala-
bresi.32 Civil recourse theory reframes tort as a law of private wrongs
and recourse. Tort law defines duties to refrain from injuring others, 
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 32.  John C.P. Goldberg & Benjamin C. Zipursky, Torts as Wrongs, 88 TEX. L. REV.
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duties which are directed or bipolar in the sense that they are owed 
to others. When these duties are breached by an action, that action 
constitutes a wrong to the obligee; it wrongs him. An action that 
breaches a right protected by tort law therefore provides a legal ba-
sis for private recourse by the obligee against the obligor in court—a 
private right of action, through which a plaintiff may attempt to ex-
act damages or relief from an injurer. 
 Now it might seem that corrective justice theories had already of-
fered a substantially similar reaction to views concerned primarily 
with loss allocation. These views, developed by Jules Coleman, Ste-
phen Perry, Arthur Ripstein, Ernest Weinrib, and others, take as 
their wellspring a principle of corrective justice that holds that tort-
feasors acquire a duty to repair the wrongful losses that their con-
duct causes. Coleman’s view, in particular, has understood tort law 
as embodying both first- and second-order duties: first-order duties 
not to injure and second-order duties of repair.33 When conduct 
breaches a relevant first-order duty and causes injury, the principle 
of corrective justice triggers a second-order duty of repair. 
 For a loss to be wrongful in the sense of requiring repair from the 
point of view of corrective justice, the wrongdoer need not be blame-
worthy. Indeed, the tortfeasor need not even be a genuine wrongdoer
in the sense of having done something wrong, all things considered. A 
person can be wronged in the sense of being made subject to a wrong-
ful loss even by actions that are morally permissible or perhaps even 
praiseworthy. Coleman writes: 
Culpability is not a condition of a wronging . . . . Indeed, in the 
case of some wronging, the injurer’s conduct is actually morally 
praiseworthy or, at least, permissible . . . . Wronging can some-
times create wrongful losses even in cases of justifiable conduct. In 
cases of wronging, neither the absence of blame nor the presence of 
praiseworthiness is sufficient to defeat a claim that a loss is 
wrongful. The wrongfulness of the loss derives from the fact that 
the conduct is . . . invasive of a right.34
The tortfeasor’s act need only have fallen below a legal norm of con-
duct established by the duty not to injure. The tort of negligence, for 
example, imposes liability on those who injure by conduct that falls 
below a standard of due care: the conduct of a “reasonable person of 
ordinary prudence.” Coleman emphasizes that people are often not 
blameworthy for falling below this standard but are nonetheless lia-
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 33.  COLEMAN, supra note 18, at 316-17.?
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ble in tort. The sense of wrong and wronging that is relevant to 
Coleman’s corrective justice theory is simply that of an infringement 
of the victim’s right not to be injured, which is correlative to the 
wrongdoer’s first-order duty not to injure. Breaches of this first-order 
duty trigger a duty to repair the injury caused by the breach, regard-
less of whether the tortfeasor’s conduct was culpable or perhaps even 
morally justifiable. 
 The significance of corrective justice theory, according to Goldberg 
and Zipursky, is that even if it takes a wronging of a victim to trigger 
the duty of repair, what matters for the theory is the tortfeasor’s duty 
to repair the victim’s loss.35 They distinguish corrective justice theo-
ries, all animated by the duty to repair a loss, from their own civil 
recourse view, according to which tort remedy is driven by the de-
fendant’s responsibility for having committed a wrong against the 
plaintiff “in a manner that renders her a victim entitled to respond to 
the wrongdoer.”36
 Goldberg and Zipursky stress Coleman’s insistence that tort law is 
fundamentally about losses, not about wrongdoing. “Tort law is about 
messes. A mess has been made, and the only question before the 
court is, who is to clean it up?”37 If tort were a state response to 
wrongs, Coleman and Perry argue, the state would offer a legal remedy 
or penalty based on the gravity of the wrong, rather than awarding a 
plaintiff damages typically keyed to the losses caused by a wrong.38
 Goldberg and Zipursky thus align corrective justice theory with 
“loss allocating” views that are concerned fundamentally with a just 
distribution of resources to remedy losses. What makes the civil re-
course view distinctive, in their view, is that it offers a relational ac-
count of tort as a law of redress for wrongs, which they claim better 
fits fundamental features of tort doctrine. According to Zipursky, 
“The key to tort liability . . . is that plaintiffs have rights to act 
against defendants, not that defendants have prior legal duties of re-
pair to plaintiffs.”39 For civil recourse theory, the point is not that tort 
defendants have a duty, but that they have a tort liability. As 
Zipursky puts it, “Liability is not best explained as a form of duty to 
those whom one has wronged, but rather as a form of vulnerability to 
the one who has been wronged.”40 Tort law concerns the sorts of con-
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duct our legal system defines as wrongfully injurious in the sense 
that, when committed, “the victim is entitled to exact something from 
the wrongdoer.”41
 What do Goldberg and Zipursky mean by a right to “exact some-
thing”? Their accounts have evolved and continue to do so. We hope 
that the present Article will contribute to this progression. Goldberg 
and Zipursky have portrayed the power to exact remedy within the 
context of what they call a Lockean or “social-contract” view.42 On 
this picture, citizens relinquish the liberty to respond aggressively to 
a wrong and receive in return from the state a certain level of securi-
ty against responsive aggression by others and additional assurance 
that a civil avenue of redress against wrongdoers will be supplied.43
The state is therefore obliged to provide plaintiffs with an avenue of 
recourse through which they are empowered to act against their vic-
timizers. The private right of action is the state’s civil empowerment 
of individuals who have been wronged against the wrongdoer. “The 
state recognizes itself as obliged to empower the plaintiff to act in 
some manner against the defendant and acts on that obligation by 
permitting the plaintiff to exact damages or have the defendant en-
joined against performing certain acts.”44
 Zipursky notes also that the existence of punitive damages sug-
gests that tort law “permit[s] the plaintiff to ‘be punitive,’ or to ‘be 
vindictive’—to inflict hardship upon the defendant out of resentment, 
spite, or the desire for revenge, not necessarily as an aspect of self-
restoration.”45 In a similar vein, Goldberg says that the civil recourse 
theory’s “animating ideas . . . are relational and retaliatory, involving 
notions of empowerment, response, and satisfaction.”46
 Presently we shall argue that justified retaliation or vindication is 
not the most promising way of developing civil recourse theory’s fun-
damental insights. We think civil recourse theory is right to stress 
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tort liability as a distinctive “vulnerability” that tortfeasors have to 
their victims.47 However, we think it is a mistake to conceive this 
vulnerability in terms of susceptibility to vindication, vengeance, or 
retaliation—ideas that are more appropriate to an honor culture or 
ancient Greek tragedy and myth than to the law of torts (or, indeed, 
to the criminal law). As we see it, the vulnerability that characterizes 
torts is a form of accountability or answerability of the same genus as 
the one involved in bipolar moral obligations. Private law, and the 
law of torts more specifically, involve the fundamental idea that indi-
viduals have obligations to and rights against one another, and that 
each person has an individual authority to hold others answerable for 
complying with obligations to him and his rights against them, just 
as others have the same authority to hold him answerable for com-
plying with his obligations to them and their rights against him. 
Goldberg and Zipursky might well agree with this point. “Even when 
a particular tort is not also a moral wrong,” they write, “saying that 
it is a legal wrong is similar to saying that it is a moral wrong in at 
least the following respects: it asserts that the act in question . . . 
merits some form of accountability when done.”48 And even more to 
the current point: “Individuals who are able to prove that someone 
has treated them in a manner that the legal system counts as a rela-
tional, injurious wrong shall have the authority to hold the wrongdo-
er accountable to him.”49
 Goldberg and Zipursky offer a number of reasons to think that the 
doctrine of tort better fits their view than corrective justice. We focus 
here on the fact that tort doctrine gives a distinctive right to the in-
jured individual to seek tort remedy, which we suggest is the legal 
expression of a conceptual point about the normative structure of bi-
polar obligations and claim rights more generally, namely, that obli-
gees have an individual authority and consequently a distinctive 
standing as victims to hold their obligors responsible for violating 
obligations held to them.
 In Civil Recourse and Separation of Wrongs and Remedies, Arthur 
Ripstein argues that a Kantian corrective justice of the kind he holds 
can also explain why it is that only victims have standing to bring a 
case in torts.50 However, while Ripstein’s argument establishes that a 
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Kantian account like his can explain victims’ distinctive standing to 
bring tort actions, we believe that it nonetheless falls short of provid-
ing a view on which a defendant can be seen to be accountable to a 
plaintiff; nor, indeed, can it explain a genuinely bipolar obligation of 
the wrongdoer to the wronged individual. 
 Ripstein also rejects Goldberg and Zipursky’s claim that corrective 
justice cannot view tort as a law of wrongs. Ripstein builds his argu-
ment on a Kantian theory of right, according to which each person 
has an “innate right of humanity” to pursue whatever ends he or she 
chooses independently of the choices of others and consistently with 
others’ equal right.51 Since pursuing ends is impossible without some 
means or other, every person must be presumed to have some means 
by right—most clearly, his own body, but also external things he can 
rightfully acquire as property.52 Individuals are wronged when others 
take their means or otherwise infringe on their right to them. Accord-
ing to Ripstein, tort law remedies wrongs, conceived as violations of such 
rights, by restoring the means to which individuals have a right.53
 The Kantian doctrine of right flows, again, from the idea that in-
dividuals have the right to use their means to pursue whatever ends 
they adopt, independently of the choices of others and consistently 
with others’ equal right. From the point of view of tort law, an indi-
vidual’s means are her bodily powers and mental capacities, her rep-
utation, and her property. These individual entitlements taken to-
gether create a system of rights through which each is his own mas-
ter and independent of others.  
 It is important to Ripstein that the victim’s original right to her 
means continues to exist even if someone takes her means from her 
in violation of her right (and so wrongs her).54 She remains entitled to 
use of her means even after another person has taken them. The duty 
of repair that is the cornerstone of corrective justice theories of tort 
is, according to Ripstein’s Kantian theory, just the tortfeasor’s duty to 
restore to someone any means to which she has a right. And a reme-
dy simply restores to the wronged individual that to which she is al-
ready entitled. Remedy replaces the deprived means to which an in-
dividual continues to have a right after the wrong. Ripstein’s version 
of corrective justice conceives of right and remedy as continuous, in 
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that an individual’s primary right to her means is the same right for 
which she claims restoration in demanding remedy. The right to 
remedy is no different from the primary right to her means. 
 Having set out his Kantian version, Ripstein’s response to Gold-
berg and Zipursky’s charge that corrective justice theory cannot ex-
plain why the law of tort gives only an injured person a private right 
of action is then simple. A right constrains the conduct of others, but 
only the bearer of the right can determine whether to exercise it. On-
ly the injured victim has a right to her means against interference 
from others. And so only the injured victim has a right to claim the 
restoration of her means when she is deprived of them. It follows 
from this analysis that a tort suit must be initiated by a plaintiff 
simply because a plaintiff is the only one with standing to exercise 
any right that she has. The law of tort may not afford a plaintiff dis-
tinctive standing in the civil recourse sense, but it uniquely affords a 
plaintiff a private right of action since a plaintiff alone is entitled to 
determine the purposes for which her means are used. Where she 
does not claim restoration of means after a deprivation, she effective-
ly allows another the use of her means. 
 Although we cannot pursue the matter fully here, we believe that 
though Ripstein’s Kantian theory of right can explain victims’ dis-
tinctive standing to bring tort actions, it cannot explain any distinc-
tive accountability tortfeasors have to victims, nor indeed, any genu-
inely bipolar obligations owed to their victims in the first place. The 
point concerns not Kantian theories in a broad sense, but theories, 
like Ripstein’s, that are based on Kant’s theory of right. And it de-
rives from the fact of what, according to Kant, a right most funda-
mentally is. For Kant, a claim right to something is an “authoriza-
tion” to use coercion in defending or securing that thing.55 As Ripstein 
puts it, Kant “identifies a right as a ‘title to coerce.’ ”56 Violations of a 
right are, Kant says, “hindrances,” and since a right is an entitlement 
to the use of coercion to protect that to which one has a right, Kant 
holds that it follows from the very idea of right that the hindering of 
hindrances is itself rightful.57
 If a right is a justification to coerce, then tort law is the mecha-
nism through which victims can rightfully coerce tortfeasors to pro-
vide them with the means to which they had a right to in the first 
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place, or with its nearest replacement. Our point, however, is that 
this entails no accountability of the tortfeasor to the victim. In fact, it 
does not entail any accountability to anyone. It just means that tort-
feasors cannot complain if their victim recovers her means, whether 
by a tort suit or in some other way, just as they could not have com-
plained if she had used force to prevent the tort in the first place. 
 Would not, however, some kind of accountability flow from the ob-
ligations that follow from the original rights that justify victims’ tort 
action? Not necessarily. The sense in which rights “constrain” conduct, 
on a Kantian view of right, is not that they entail moral constraints 
in the sense of genuinely bipolar obligations to victims that the tort-
feasor’s tortious conduct violates. The only moral constraint that fol-
lows from rights, conceived as justifications for coercion, is that right 
holders are justified in constraining violations of their rights. 
 This is a fundamentally different picture from the view that claim 
rights entail that the person against whom the right is held is obli-
gated, and therefore accountable, to the right holder not to violate her 
right. No distinctive accountability to the victim is entailed; indeed, 
no accountability to anyone whatsoever is entailed. We could even 
say that, on the Kantian theory of right, the fact that one has a right 
against someone is not itself a moral reason of any kind for that per-
son to accord one what one can claim from him by right. Of course, 
there may, and most usually will, be reasons that a Kantian moral 
theory will explain why one should not violate the right. The point is, 
the fact that someone has a right is not itself such a reason—that is 
simply the fact that the right holder will be justified in constraining 
the person against whom the right is held not to violate the right. 
 We believe that civil recourse theory has a potentially better ac-
count of victims’ distinctive standing to bring a suit in torts. To theo-
rize adequately both the original rights and bipolar obligations with 
which tort law is concerned and the distinctive standing that tort law 
gives to victims, it is essential, in our view, to appreciate the way the 
concept of accountability enters into both. Claim rights and bipolar 
obligations are, as a conceptual matter, what obligors are accounta-
ble to obligees (right holders) for doing, and the law of torts provides 
an appropriate legal expression of this fundamental idea. 
 In this respect, civil private law, in general, and torts, in particu-
lar, are to bipolar obligations as the criminal law is to moral obliga-
tion period. Just as representative third parties or the moral commu-
nity have the authority to hold wrongdoers responsible through ac-
countability-seeking reactive attitudes, it is also appropriately up to 
the people’s representatives to decide whether to bring a criminal 
action. Even whether to prosecute a rights violation is not uniquely 
up to the victim. But if the issue is civil rather than criminal respon-
sibility, then since this concerns the obligee’s individual authority 
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rather than community members’ representative authority, obligees 
really should have special legal standing. 
 In recognizing the distinctive individual authority of victims, a 
civil recourse theory of torts is supported by a conception of mutual 
accountability that is grounded in the second-person standpoint. At 
the same time, however, Goldberg and Zipursky sometimes present 
civil recourse theory in terms of “vindication” and “revenge,” as we 
noted above.58 So we would like to say more about why we think this 
is a mistake and to suggest that the idea of the mutual accountability 
of equals can provide a more promising alternative. 
 At one point, Goldberg places a more agonistic interpretation of 
civil recourse theory within an ideal of equal respect. “Part of the 
state’s treating individuals with respect and respecting their equality 
with others,” he says, “consists of its being committed to empowering 
them to act against others who have wronged them.”59 It is im-
portant, however, to distinguish two fundamentally different concep-
tions of (recognition) respect for persons that relate to fundamentally 
different conceptions of the person and that mediate different concep-
tions of social order.60 One is the idea of respect for one another as 
mutually accountable equals—second-personal respect. And the other 
is the form of recognition respect that mediates a status hierarchy of 
honor—honor respect. Vindication, retaliation, and revenge are re-
sponses to disrespect within an order of honor. Dishonoring disre-
spect (contempt) seeks to lower its victim’s status, and when it is un-
opposed, it effectively does so. The victim’s status can only be re-
stored by retaliation against the dishonorer, which avenges the in-
sult. The response to disrespect is a reciprocating disrespect. 
 The sense of person in play in an honor culture is that of persona,
an individual’s social presentation or face. Someone has a certain sta-
tus—or occupies a social role—when others respect his person (perso-
na) in the sense of allowing him the social role he wishes by playing 
along with him as supporting actors in a social drama. When, howev-
er, they treat his self-presentation with contempt, his persona is no 
longer supported, and he loses face. The emotional response to con-
tempt is shame, whose natural expression is to cover one’s face and 
hide, to remove oneself (even if only) imaginatively from view. 
 Even if the ideas of retaliation and vengeance are most at home 
within a hierarchical status culture, that is not, of course, what 
Goldberg and Zipursky are proposing. They see the state, through 
tort law, as “respecting [victims’] equality with others.”61 Nonetheless, 
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the way the state would be doing so would still be within the concep-
tual framework of an honor culture, by providing victims the oppor-
tunity to restore their status by avenging their dishonoring wrong.  
 Consider in this connection a similar proposal that Jean Hampton 
made about how to conceive of punishment of rights violations. Those 
who violate others’ rights presume a kind of authority over others. 
They act towards their victims as though their victims have lesser 
value. They arrogate a kind of “lordship” over their victims and seek 
to establish this by making their victims submit to the indignity in-
volved in their crime.62 According to Hampton, the “retributive idea” 
is that the appropriate response to such attempted diminishment and 
“defeat” of the victim is to turn tables and force the wrongdoer’s 
“submission,” thereby defeating him and reconfirming or “vindicat-
ing” the victim’s value.63 According to Hampton, punishment involves 
a public humiliation of the arrogant violator that simultaneously 
brings him down a peg and restores his victim’s status or honor.64
 We might think of Hampton’s proposal as the analogue in criminal 
law of a vengeance interpretation of civil recourse theory in tort law. 
The point of the tort proceeding is not for the state to humiliate the 
rights violator and thereby restore the equal status of criminal and 
victim, but to provide a public forum in which the victim can do so. In 
our view, however, this imports the idea of equality into a conceptual 
structure that is still fundamentally that of an honor culture.65 Re-
spect for one another as mutually accountable equals is a different 
idea, not just in the sense that honor cultures are generally hierar-
chical, but because respect in this latter sense is essentially second 
personal and reciprocal in a way that honor respect even between 
equally honored equals is not.66
 To respect someone as a mutually accountable equal is to hold 
oneself answerable to him at the same time one holds him answerable 
to oneself. It is to be in second-personal relation to someone. Respect 
for persons in this sense is what Strawson calls a “participant’s” atti-
tude, an attitude of “involvement or participation with others in in-
ter-personal human relationships.”67 Honor respect and contempt, by 
contrast, even honor respect for equals or peers, are third personal; 
they are “observer’s” or “objective” attitudes in Strawson’s sense. Con-
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tempt towards someone, for example, is not necessarily expressed to
that person; rather, it is more characteristically expressed to peers 
who are invited to join in the contemptuous attitude.  
 When someone in a community of mutually accountable equals 
violates an obligation, whether an obligation period or a bipolar obli-
gation, she does not thereby become a legitimate object of contempt. 
To the contrary, she is held accountable for her violation. And this 
reciprocating response is no form of disrespect that seeks to lower her 
status or retaliate. It is rather a reactive attitude like moral blame 
that implicitly seeks to engage the other second-personally and de-
mand respect. Because the attitude is essentially interpersonal or 
second personal, it views another in a way that recognizes him as a 
mutually accountable equal. As Strawson puts the point, reactive at-
titudes continue to “view [someone] as a member of the moral com-
munity; only as one who has offended against its demands.”68 They 
demand respect in a way that is itself respectful, at least implicitly. 
 It is a reflection of this that the “first-party” attitude that re-
sponds to second- or third-party reactive attitudes is not shame, but 
guilt. Guilt is the feeling as if being appropriately charged (second 
personally) with some violation, and its natural expression is also 
second personal—the desire to acknowledge guilt and take responsi-
bility. That is partly what it is to hold oneself answerable. 
 When we hold one another answerable, whether for wrongdoing 
period, as representative members of the moral community, or for 
wronging us individually, as the individual to a victim to whom the 
injurer is bound by a bipolar obligation, we enter into a relation of 
reciprocal recognition and mutual respect for one another as mutual-
ly accountable equals. Holding someone answerable thus precisely 
does not return disrespect for disrespect; it embodies a respectful 
demand for respect. 
 If we project these ideas into the law of torts, it would seem that 
for the legal system to “trea[t] individuals with respect and respec[t] 
their equality with others,” would not, in Goldberg’s words, “empower[] 
them to act against others who have wronged them.”69 Rather, the 
legal system would enable individuals to hold their victimizers an-
swerable by respectfully demanding respect. Only in this way, we be-
lieve, can tort law genuinely express an ideal of mutual accountability.70
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III.   TORT REMEDY, PERSPECTIVE, AND THE COMMUNITY
 Having emphasized the role of mutual accountability in civil re-
course, our account of tort remedy deserves clarification. A tort suit 
not only is an attempt to exact remedy from a defendant but also 
serves to hold a defendant accountable in a characteristic way—
according to legal standards that have general application to a com-
munity of mutually accountable equals. Thus, although a plaintiff 
bringing a claim based on her individual authority advocates her own 
position, her prayer for tort relief is at bottom a call to initiate a legal 
process that seeks mutual recognition of the rights of each party. 
 In the course of this judicial process, courts apply norms and di-
rectives established for the whole society to individual cases, settling 
disputes through the application of those norms.71 Courts accomplish 
this with hearings structured to enable an impartial determination of 
the rights and responsibilities of particular persons on the basis of 
evidence and argument from each party. When presented, evidence is 
made available to be examined and confronted by an opposing party 
in open court, and each party has the opportunity to answer publical-
ly the arguments of the opposing party on the record.  In making and 
interpreting arguments in court, lawyers and judges conceive of the 
law as a whole, attempting to discern and articulate coherence by 
integrating particular propositions into a systematic legal structure.  
Parties and their representatives frame legal arguments within this 
integrated system, inviting judges and juries to consider how their 
position fits into a coherent conception that has general application 
to the community.72 The parties’ arguments are tailored, of course, to 
their individual situations and commitments. As Waldron points out, 
part of the law’s respecting individuals is that it treats them as 
though they “had a view or perspective of their own to present on the 
application of the norm to their conduct and situation.”73     
 Even so, a tort claim is not simply a demand from the plaintiff’s 
perspective in what Waldron has called a “lobbying sense”; it does not 
merely say what the law should be from only the plaintiff’s point of 
view. Rather, civil suits allow the parties to influence the court’s de-
liberation about what that the law is, such that all members of the 
community should be held accountable to its requirements. To be 
sure, a plaintiff asks the court to adopt her arguments, but in order 
to prevail, these must be offered in a way that is susceptible of gen-
eral public application to a community of mutually accountable 
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equals. Thus, in a suit arising from a plaintiff’s individual authority, 
a judgment is imposed from a more general perspective.74
 Focusing on this feature of tort as mutual accountability further 
illuminates the way in which the institution supports, as others have 
argued, social equality and the dignity of persons. Waldron and 
Seanna Shiffrin have both recently argued that reasonableness 
standards, which undergird a significant amount of tort law, respect 
the dignity of each party in part because they embody this particular 
conception of persons as capable of holding themselves accountable to 
each other.75 Applying reasonableness standards to individual con-
duct “embodies a crucial dignitarian idea—[that] those to whom the 
norms are applied [are] beings capable of explaining themselves.”76
The application of legal standards to individual conduct conceives of 
citizens as capable of apprehending the rationales by which the law 
governs them and of relating standards to their view of the relation 
between their actions and purposes and those of the community.77
Shiffrin further reminds us that rather than requiring application of 
a rule by rote, reasonableness standards induce deliberation among 
citizens, requiring that they ask themselves, for example, whether 
they are taking due care, behaving reasonably, or treating one anoth-
er fairly.78 This is itself an exercise in mutual accountability. Reason-
ableness standards make possible “richer forms of moral and demo-
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cratic relations”79 and require individuals to actively apprehend and 
appreciate others’ rights.80
 Tom Tyler’s experimental studies show that tort victims seek, not 
compensation pure and simple, but to hold tortfeasors accountable 
through fair procedures that enact mutual accountability. The “pri-
mary focus,” Tyler observes, “is on bringing to account ‘responsible 
people.’ ”81 Tort claimants “are primarily interested in receiving an 
apology and restoring social order and respect.”82 “[T]he key issue on 
people’s minds [is] moral accountability.”83 Where an individual has 
been negligently injured, compensation is generally “a poor substi-
tute for . . . accountability.”84 It is important, moreover, that account-
ability come through fair procedures. Studies of decision acceptance 
suggest that while both outcome and procedural fairness matter, pro-
cedural justice usually matters more.85 People are more apt to accept 
unfavorable outcomes when they result from procedures they regard 
as fair.86
 What makes a procedure fair according to litigants?87 First, having 
a voice or participating in the process.88 Second, the perceived neu-
trality and lack of bias of authorized deciders.89 Judicial openness 
and explanation of the basis for decisions also bolster perceived fair-
ness, as does the quality of interpersonal treatment by authorities.  
Acknowledgment of litigants’ rights increases individuals’ sense that 
they have been treated with respect and dignity.90
 In our view, both remedy and process in the law of torts enact the 
parties’ mutual accountability to one another. We conclude, therefore, 
that civil recourse theory is best elaborated in these terms. What is 
at issue is not simply an individual authority that victims have to act 
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against their victimizers, but an authority to hold tortfeasors ac-
countable that victim and tortfeasor share reciprocally or mutually.91
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